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The internet is as beneficial as it is troublesome. It provides a single person the opportunity
to reach millions, circumventing such traditional
gatekeepers as book and newspaper publishers.'
However, the same medium provides opportunities for individuals to mistreat its general freedom
of communication and widespread availability of
information. 2 The internet also creates problems
when courts, lawmakers and regulators impose3
antiquated laws and policies on the new medium.
In one of the most recent issues to arise, the regulator is the Federal Election Commission and the
antiquated law is the Federal Election Campaign
4
Act of 1971.

The Federal Election Commission ("FEC" or
"Commission") received a complaint May 4, 1999,
asking it to apply a 27-year-old statute5 to an internet site. 6 The site, a satirical criticism of RepubSee Bruce W. Sandford & Michael J. Lorenger, Teaching
an Old Dog New Tricks: The First Amendment in an Online World,
28 CONN. L. REv., 1137, 1141-42 (1996).
2
See, e.g., Lydia Adetunji, U.S. Representatives ConsiderFederal Laws on Cyberstalking, HARTFORD COURANT, Sept. 30, 1999,
at A13.
3
See, e.g., Intermatic, Inc. v. Toeppen, 947 F. Supp. 1227,
1227-28 (N.D. Ill. 1996) (holding that an individual's use of
the federally registered "Intermatic" trademark as an internet
domain name violated the Federal Trademark Dilution Act
and the Illinois Anti-Dilution Act).
4
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92225, 86 Stat. 11 (1972) (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 431 et seq. (1994)).
5 See id.
6 See Letter from Benjamin L. Ginsberg, Counsel, Governor George W. Bush for President Exploratory Committee,
Inc., to Lawrence M. Noble, Esq., General Counsel, Federal
Election Commission (May 3, 1999) available at
<www.gwbush.com/meanbush.htm> (complaint against Zack
Exley and www.gwbush.com) [hereinafter Exley Complaint].
7
See Letter from Benjamin L. Ginsberg, Counsel, Governor George W. Bush for President Exploratory Committee,
Inc., to Zack Exley, owner, gwbush.com (Apr. 14, 1999) available at <www.gwbush.com/litigiousbush.htm> (cease and desist letter). On October 18, 1999, the Bush campaign substan-

lican presidential candidate George W. Bush, allegedly violated a number of federal election
regulations. The Governor George W. Bush for
President Exploratory Committee, Inc. ("Exploratory Committee") found the website particularly
offensive because the site's appearance and domain name-www.gwbush.com-closely resemble
those of the Exploratory Committee's website at
7
www.georgewbush.com.
The issue goes beyond the Bush campaign's distaste for the satire; under the rules of the FEC,
anyone who expressly advocates the election or
defeat of a clearly defined candidate on a personal internet site and does not disclose expenditure information could be in violation of federal
election law.8 In addition to the complaint, the
Bush campaign requested that the Commission issue an advisory opinion clarifying a number of istially changed the interface of www.georgewbush.com,
distinguishing it from www.gwbush.com. See Governor Bush
Unveils Innovative New Website (visited Oct. 19, 1999)
<www.georgewbush.com/News/1999/october/.
pr101899_web.asp>.
8 See 11 C.F.R. § 110.11 (1999) (requiring a financed
communication expressly advocating the election or defeat
of a clearly identified candidate to include a disclaimer giving the reader notice of the identity of the persons who paid
for or authorized the communication); 11 C.F.R.
§ 104.4(c)(1) (1999) (requiring political committees to file
disclosure reports with the FEC and the Secretary of State
where the expenditure is made if the expenditure is in support or opposition to a candidate for President of the United
States); 11 C.F.R. § 109.2(a) (1999) (requiring "[e]very person other than a political committee, who makes independent expenditures aggregating in excess of $250 during a calendar year" to file a disclosure report with the FEC); 11
C.F.R. § 100.5(a) (1999) (defining as a political committee
any association or group which receives contributions or
makes expenditures exceeding $1,000); Advisory Opinion
1998-22, 1 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin. Guide (CCH) 6277, 12411
(1998) (finding that a web page expressly advocating the
election or defeat of a candidate requires disclosure as an
independent expenditure or a political committee).
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sues regarding the internet and campaign disclosure laws. 9 The Bush campaign asked how to
assess the value of a website created by volunteers
or persons unaffiliated with the campaign.' 0 Additionally, the Bush campaign asked for guidance
concerning Commission regulations of internet
vending," internet polls, 12 the use of email by
committee volunteers 13 and issues regarding the
solicitation of contributions through the in14
ternet.
The FEC issued a Notice of Inquiy ("NOI") seeking comment on internet campaign activity and
the questions posed by the Bush campaign. 5 The
notice focused on the concerns of campaign committees and how the internet activity may trigger
contribution disclosure laws. 16 In addition, the
Commission asked for comment on how the FEC
7
should determine the value of a website.'
Disclosure requirements are part of a broad set
of regulations governing election law. Modern
9

See Draft Advisory Opinion 1999-17 at 1 (1999).
See id. In a draft advisory opinion, FEC staff noted that
activity by volunteers using personal property, including personal computers, does not constitute a contribution under
section 100.7(b) (4) of the Commission's rules. See id. at 5-6.
The use of corporate facilities is allowable under section
114.9(a) of the Commission's rules if the use is occasional,
isolated or incidental and does not increase the operating
costs of the corporation. See id. The FEC staff also tentatively
concluded that websites created by individuals unaffiliated
with the campaign are not contributions if the individual
constructed the website completely independent of the committee's control. See id. at 6-7. However, the FEC staff acknowledged that such a website would constitute an independent expenditure if the costs exceed $250 during a
calendar year. See Advisory Opinion 1999-17 at 7 (1999).
11 See Draft Advisory Opinion 1999-17 at 2.
12
See id.
13
See id. at 3.
14
See id. at 4.
15
See Use of the Internet for Campaign Activity, Notice of
Inquiry and Request for Comments, 64 Fed. Reg. 60360, 60361
(1999).
16 See id. at 60361, 60363.
17
See id. at 60362.
18 Federal Elections Campaign Act Amendments of 1974,
Pub. L. No. 93443, 88 Stat. 1272 (1974) (codified as
amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-456 (1994)).
1' See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 F.2d 821, 831 (D.C. Cir.
1975), affd in part, rev'd in part, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (finding
many of the FECA's contribution limitations constitutionally
valid under the First Amendment).
20
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
21
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 193 (construing 18 U.S.C.
§ 608(e) (1) (repealed XXXX)). In the original Act, section
608(e) (1) read,
No person may make any expenditure (other than an
expenditure made by or on behalf of a candidate within
the meaning of subsection (c) (2) (B)) relative to a
10
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election law originated with the enactment of the
Federal Election Campaign Act ("FECA") of 1971,
which Congress substantially amended in 1974.18

The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia noted that the FECA was "by far
the most comprehensive reform legislation passed
by Congress concerning the election of the President, Vice-President, and members of Congress."'19 The FECA's primary purpose was to
"limit the actuality and appearance of corruption
resulting from large individual financial contributions[.]"20 Among the restrictions, the FECA im-

posed limits on expenditures by political committees and individuals 2 1 and required the disclosure
of contributions and expenditures by candidates,
22
political committees and individuals.
This comment will first discuss important
Supreme Court decisions that have shaped FEC
implementation of the Act. Second, it will examine FEC policy concerning the internet, conclearly identified candidate during a calendar year
which, when added to all other expenditures made by
such person during the year advocating the election or
defeat of such candidate, exceeds $1000.
Id.
22
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 154 (construing 2 U.S.C. § 434).
Prior to Buckley, section 434(e) read,
Every person (other than a political committee or candidate) who makes contributions or expenditures, other
than by contribution to a aggregate amount in excess of
$100 within a calendar year shall file with the Commission a statement containing the information required by
this section. Statements required by this subsection shall
be filed on the dates on which reports by political committees are filed by need not be cumulative.
2 U.S.C. § 434(e). The current provision imposing disclosure
reads,
Every person (other than a political committee) who
makes independent expenditures in an aggregate
amount or value in excess of $250 during a calendar
year shall file a statement containing the information required under subsection (b) (3) (A) of this section for all
contributions received by such person. (2) Statements
required to be filed by this subsection shall be filed in
accordance with subsection (a)(2) of this section, and
shall include-(A) the information required by subsection (b) (6) (B) (iii) of this section, indicating whether
the independent expenditure is in support of, or in opposition to, the candidate involved; (B) under penalty of
perury, a certification whether or not such independent
expenditure is made in cooperation, consultation, or
concert, with, or at the request or suggestion of, any candidate or any authorized committee or agent of such
candidate; and (C) the identification of each person
who made a contribution in excess of $200 to the person
filing such statement which was made for the purpose of
furthering an independent expenditure.
2 U.S.C. § 434(c) (1994).

20001

Independent Expenditures on the Internet

centrating on how the Commission calculates expenditures. Third, it will discuss the matter
pending before the FEC concerning internet disclosure rules. 23 Finally, this comment concludes
that the FEC should carve a narrow exemption for
the costs of creating an independent website for
advocacy purposes.
BUCKLEY V VALEO: CAMPAIGN FINANCE
AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT

I.

In a landmark decision dealing with a number
of latent issues in the FECA, the Supreme Court
in Buckley v. Valeo&4 confronted two issues relevant
25
to independent expenditures on the internet.
First, the Court distinguished contributions from
expenditures, holding that while a limitation on
individual contributions to a federal campaign
passes First Amendment scrutiny, financial limitations on expenditures unconstitutionally restrain
political speech. 26 The court stated, "A [financial]
contribution serves as a general expression of support for the candidate and his views, but does not
communicate the underlying basis for the support."

27

However, limitations on expenditures by

individuals and groups "impose direct and substantial restraints on the quantity of political
'28

speech."

Second, the Court held that expendi-

ture disclosure requirements comport with the
First Amendment because they allow public review of information concerning the source of
campaign expenditures, deter corruption and
provide a means to detect violations of contribu29
tion limitations.
Limitations on Expenditures

A.

United States Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia held that these sections of the Act and
others pass First Amendment scrutiny. 30 In a per
curiam opinion, the Court evoked strong First
Amendment principles in confronting the FECA's
limitations on expenditures. 3 1 The Court stated,
"The Act's contribution and expenditure limitations operate in an area of the most fundamental
First Amendment activities. Discussion of public
issues and debate on the qualifications of candidates are integral to the operation of the system
of government established by our Constitution. 32
The Supreme Court disagreed with the circuit
court's view that expenditure limitations regulated conduct and not speech. 33 The Supreme

Court found limitations on expenditures particularly offensive to the First Amendment and recognized the importance of expensive mass media as
tools through which citizens may reach an increasingly large audience. 34 The Court noted,
A restriction on the amount of money a person or
group can spend on political communication during a
campaign necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by restricting the number of issues discussed, the
depth of their exploration, and the size of the audience
reached... The electorate's increasing dependence on
television, radio, and other mass media for news and

information has made these expensive modes of communication indispensable instruments of effective political speech.35

The quantitative restriction, which entailed a
maximum fine of $25,000 and imprisonment for
not more than one year, 36 triggered strict scrutiny
to determine "whether the language of section
608(e)(1) affords the '[p] recision of regulation
[that] must be the touchstone in an area so
closely touching our most precious freedoms.' "37
The Court found the statute's language limiting
"any expenditure ...relative to a clearly identi-

The Supreme Court granted certiorari after the

31

See Exley Complaint, supra note ????.
424 U.S. 1 (1976).
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 20-22, 66-68.
See id. at 20-21.
Id. at 21.
Id. at 39.
See id. at 66-68.
See Buckley, 519 F.2d at 897.
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14.

32

Id.

23
24
25
26
27
28
29

30

See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 15-16; Buckley, 519 F.2d at 840.
The circuit court relied on the standard set forth in United
States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376-77 (1968). In O'Brien, the
Supreme Court validated a federal law against burning draft
cards, holding that when "speech" and "non-speech" elements exist, a sufficiently important government interest jus33

tifles limitations on First Amendment freedoms. See id. at
376-377.
-4
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
35
Id. at 19 (footnote omitted). In a footnote, the court
analogized political speech to driving a car: "Being free to
engage in unlimited political expression subject to a ceiling
on expenditures is like being free to drive an automobile as
far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline."
Id. at 19 n.18.
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 187 (construing 18 U.S.C. § 608(i)
36
(repealed XXXX)). Section 608(i) read, "Any person who violates any provision of this section shall be fined not more
than $25,000 or imprisoned not more than one year, or
both." Id.
37
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 41 (alteration in original) (quoting
NAACP v.Button, 371 U.S. 415, 438 (1963)).
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fled candidate"3 8 unconstitutionally vague on its
face.3 ' The Court concluded that the statute's use
of the word "relative" must be interpreted as express advocacy for a "clearly identified candidate." 40 The Court listed "magic words" that, if

used, would fall under section 608(e) (1). This list
included "vote for," "elect," "support," "cast your
ballot for," "Smith for Congress," "vote against,"
"defeat" and "reject."4 ' However, after reining in
the vague language of the statute, the Court
found the ceiling on independent expenditures
unconstitutional, reasoning that candidate advocacy deserves as much protection as issue advocacy or lobbying to urge the passage of legisla42
tion.
B.

In the same opinion, the Court contrasted this
speech-protective language by upholding a limitation on the amount an individual, partnership,
committee, association or corporation may contribute to a federal candidate. 43 Section 608(b) (1)
of the FECA stated that "no person shall make
contributions to any candidate with respect to any
election for Federal office which, in the aggre$1000." 4 4

Borrowing the standard set

by previous cases on associational freedoms, 4 5 the
Court said "[e]ven a 'significant interference'
with protected rights of political association' may
be sustained if the State demonstrates a sufficiently important interest and employs means
closely drawn to avoid unnecessary abridgment of
associational freedoms." 4 6 The Court cited three
government interests furthered by the limitation
38

Buckley, 424 U.S.

at 193

that would validate the section. First, it noted that
limitations on contributions prevent real and perceived corruption through large financial contributions. 47 Second, by limiting the influence of the
affluent, more citizens may play a larger role in
affecting the outcome of elections.,4 8 Third, such
limitations may serve to suppress the exponen49
tially increasing cost of running for office.

C.

Disclosure Requirements

Similarly, the Court upheld the FECA's expen50
diture reporting and disclosure requirements.
Section 434(e) of the Act originally read,
Every person (other than a political committee or candidate) who makes contributions or expenditures,
other than by contribution to a political committee or

Contribution Limitations

gate, exceed
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(construing 18 U.S.C.

§ 608(e)(1) (repealed XXXX)).
:'9 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44.
40
Id.
41 See id. at 44 n.52. But see FEC v. Furgatch, 807 F.2d 857,
864 (9th Cir. 1987) (concluding that speech may be express
advocacy without using the words listed by the Court in Buckley). The Ninth Circuit said the speech "must, when read as a
whole, and with limited reference to external events, be susceptible of no other reasonable interpretation but as an exhortation to vote for or against a specific candidate." Id. at
864. The Court noted that speech can be "express" even
though it is ambiguous. See id. Also, "advocacy" necessitates a
plea for action. See id. Finally, the Ninth Circuit said it must
be clear what action is advocated. See id.
42
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 47-48.
43 See id. at 35.
44
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 188 (construing 18 U.S.C.
§ 608(b) (1) (repealed XXXX)).
45 See, e.g., Cousins v. Wigoda, 419 U.S. 477, 491-92

candidate, in an aggregate amount in excess of $100
within a calendar year shall file with the Commission a
statement containing the information required by this
section. Statements required by this subsection shall be
filed on the date on which reports by political
commit5

tees are filed but need not be cumulative.
The Court held that disclosure requirements for
political committees pass First Amendment scru52
tiny.
Again, the Court used a strict scrutiny standard
to test the disclosure provision in section 434(e).
The Court said, "The provision is responsive to
the legitimate fear that efforts would be made, as
they had been in the past, to avoid the disclosure
requirements by routing financial support of candidates through avenues not explicitly covered by
the general provisions of the Act. 5 3- Originally,
under the Act, expenditure was defined as
(1) .. .a purchase, payment, distribution, anything of

(1975) (holding that the Circuit Court erred in issuing an
injunction that abrogated the National Democratic Party's selection of delegates for its convention).
40
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 25 (quoting Cousins, 419 U.S. at

488).
See id. at 25-26.
See id. at 26.
49 See id. at 26.
51
See id. at 61.
51
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 160 (construing 2 U.S.C.
§ 434(e)). The current applicable section is 2 U.S.C.
47
48

§ 434(c). Section 434(c) reads, "Every person (other than a
political committee) who makes independent expenditures
in an aggregate amount or value in excess of $250 during a
calendar year shall file a statement containing the information required under subsection (b) (3) (A) of this section for
all contribution received by such person." 2 U.S.C. § 434(c)
(1994).
52

See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 84.

5.

Id. at 76 (citation omitted).
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value, made for the purpose of (A) influencing the
nomination for election, or the election, of any person
to Federal office, or to the office of presidential and
vice presidential elector; or (B) influencing the results
of a primary election held for the selection of delegates
to a national nominating convention of a political party
or for the expression of a preference for the nomination of persons for election to the office of President of
the United States; (2) ...

thorized or requested by a candidate or his agent,
to some person other than a candidate or political
committee, and (2) when they make expenditures
for communications that expressly advocate the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate." 6 1

a contract, promise, or agree-

ment, express or implied, whether or not legally enforceable, to make any expenditure; (3) ... the transfer

FEC V MASSACHUSE7TS CITIZENS FOR
LIFE: BURDENSOME DISCLOSURE
REQUIREMENTS

II.

of funds by54a political committee to another political
committee.

Among its many exceptions, 55 section 431 (f) exempted "any communication by any person which
is not made for the purpose of influencing the
nomination for election, or election, of any per' 56
son to [flederal office. "

First, the Court addressed the vague language
in section 431 (f) defining an expenditure as the
use of money or assets "for the purpose of...
influencing" an election. 57 Worried that the language of section 431(f) would encompass issue
advocacy, the Court concluded that communication must be "express advocacy" 58 to fall under
the definition of expenditure in section 431(f).59
The Court reasoned that the disclosure requirement, narrowly construed, constitutes "a reasonable and minimally restrictive method of furthering First Amendment values by opening the basic
processes of our federal election system to public
view."

60

Summarizing its holding, the Court said individuals and groups not acting as political committees must comply with the reporting requirements
under section 434 (e) "(1) when they make contributions earmarked for political purposes or au54
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 147-48 (construing 2 U.S.C.
§ 431 (f) (1)-(3)).
55
Originally, section 431 (f) included an exemption for
the press. See 2 U.S.C. § 431 (f) (4) (A). Other exemptions include nonpartisan "get out the vote" activity, see 2 U.S.C.
§ 431 (f) (4) (B), communications to stockholders or members
of organizations, see 2 U.S.C. § 431 (f) (4) (C), the use of real
or personal property that does not exceed $500 or candidate
travel expenses that do not exceed $500, see 2 U.S.C.
§ 431 (f) (4) (D)-(E), costs incurred by a state or local political party for printing lists of three or more candidates, see 2
U.S.C. § 431 (f) (4) (G), and payments by corporations or labor organizations that are not expenditures under 18 U.S.C.
§ 610, see 2 U.S.C. § 431 (f)(4)(H). The current exceptions to
the definition of "expenditure" are codified at 2 U.S.C.
§ 431(9) (B). In addition to these exceptions, the current list
of exceptions to "expenditure" include costs incurred by an
authorized committee or candidate while soliciting contributions. See 2 U.S.C. § 431(9) (B) (vi). Limited legal and accounting services are not expenditures. See 2 U.S.C.
§ 431 (9) (B) (vii). Also, ballot access payments transferred to

In 1986, the Supreme Court revisited the Buckley court's finding that disclosure requirements
comport with the First Amendment. 62 In FEC v.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, the Court found unconstitutional the disclosure requirements for certain corporations. 63 The Court reasoned that the
extensive disclosure requirements of section
441 (b) (2) unconstitutionally burdened a closely
held corporation created for the purpose of issue
64
advocacy.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life was a nonprofit,
non-stock corporation. Its purpose was "to foster
respect for human life and to defend the right to
life of all human beings, born and unborn,
through educational, political and other forms of
activities [.] "65 The corporation acquired resources through donations from "members" and
fund-raising events. 6 6 Massachusetts Citizens for
Life irregularly published a newsletter containing
information on legislative activity and court decisions. It was a tool to recruit volunteers, and it
usually urged readers to contact government offi67
cials to express their views.

another political party's committee or state official are not
expenditures. See 2 U.S.C. § 431 (9) (B) (x).
(4) (F) (construed in Buckley, 424 U.S.
56 2 U.S.C. § 431 (f)
at 149).
57
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 77 (citing 2 U.S.C.

§ 431 (f) (4) (F)).
See id. at 44 n.52.
See id. at 80.
60 Id. at 82 (footnote omitted). But see Talley v. California,
362 U.S. 60 (1945) (finding unconstitutional an ordinance
requiring all handbills to contain the name of the printer,
author or manufacturer and the name of the distributor).
61
Id. at 80.
See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 478 U.S. 238,
62
264-65 (1986).
See id. at 264-65.
63
64
See id. at 263-64 (construing 2 U.S.C. § 441 (b) (2)).
65
Id. at 241-42.
58

59

66

See id. at 242.

67

See id.
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Before the 1978 primary elections, Massachusetts Citizens for Life published a "Special Edition" of its newsletter with the headline, "Everything you need to know to vote pro-life." 6

The

newsletter listed candidates and indicated the organization's approval or disapproval of the candidates' voting record on three issues. 69 Additionally, the newsletter published the pictures of
candidates who had a 100 percent approval rating
0
from Massachusetts Citizens for Life. 7
A.

Expanding "Express Advocacy"

The Supreme Court found that the "Special
Edition" constituted an expenditure under section 441b(b)(2). That section reads, "The term
'contribution or expenditure' shall include any
direct or indirect payment, distribution, loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money, or any services,
or anything of value .

.

. to any candidate, cam-

paign committee, or political party or organization in this section . . ."71 The Court acknowledged that the newsletter must constitute "express
advocacy" to fall under the definition of section
441b(b) (2).72 Although the publication did not
contain the "magic words" listed in Buckley v.
Valeo, 7 3

the Court held that the newsletter ex-

pressly advocated the election of the named candidates because the newsletter's essential nature
was to advocate for the election of pro-life candidates.74 The Court argued that the newsletter constituted "express advocacy" because it provided
names and photographs of candidates with "an
explicit directive: vote for these (named) candi-
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Citizens for Life's claim that the newsletter fell
under the press exemption under 2 U.S.C.
§ 431 (9) (B) (i). Section 431 (9) (B) (I) reads, "The
term 'expenditure' does not include, any news
story, commentary, or editorial distributed
through the facilities of any broadcasting station,
newspaper, magazine, or other periodical publication, unless such facilities are owned or controlled
by any political party, political committee, or candidate. '7 6 The Court reasoned that even if the
Massachusetts Citizens for Life newsletter were exempt, the "Special Edition" does not benefit from
the exemption because it differed substantially
from the previous newsletters. 77 The organization
used a different staff to publish the "Special Edition," it was distributed on a grander scale and to
readers unaffiliated with the organization, the
publication contained no volume or issue number
and it did not bear the Massachusetts Citizens for
Life masthead.7 The Court defended this finding
against the objection of Massachusetts Citizens for
Life by arguing that "it is precisely such factors
that in combinatiori permit the distinction of
' 79
campaign flyers fro'rn regular publications."
C.

Disclosures Offending the First
Amendment-Carving a Narrow Exception

Additionally, the Court rejected Massachusetts

However, after determining that the Massachusetts Citizens for Life newsletter fell under section
441(b) (2), the Court held that the disclosure requirements imposed upon the corporation violated the First Amendment as applied to Massachusetts Citizens for Life."" Because Massachusetts
Citizens for Life was a corporation, it had to create a "separate segregated fund" to use for expenditures advocating the election of candidates
for federal office.8'
The act of creating this fund would place the

71

See Massachusetts Citizens For Life, 478 U.S. at 243.
See id.
See id. at 243-44.
2 U.S.C. § 441b(b) (2) (1994).

72

See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 249 (rely-

tion to limit or burden in any way the [sic] First Amendment freedoms of the press or of association. [The exemption] assures the unfettered right of the newspaper,
TV networks, and other media to cover and comment on

dates."

B.

75

The Press Exemption

68
69
70

ing on Buckley, 424

U.S. at 80, which required "express advo-

cacy" in order to distinguish and protect issue advocacy from
expenditures advocating the election of a candidate for federal office).
73 See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44 n.52.
74
See Massachusetts Citizensfor Life, 479 U.S. at 249-50.
75
See id. at 249-50.
76
2 U.S.C. § 431 (9) (B) (i) (1994). The exemption was
designed to clarify
that it is not the intent of Congress in the present legisla-

political campaigns.
Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 250. (quoting
H.R. REP. No. 93-1239, at 4 (1974)).
77
See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 250-51.
78

79

See id. at 250-51.
See id. at 251.

See id. at 264-65.
See id. at 253 (citing sections 441b(a) and
441 (b)(2) (c), the Court said, "Because it is incorporated ...
Massachusetts Citizens For Life must establish a 'separate segregated fund' if it wishes to engage in any independent
80

S
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organization under the definition of a "political
committee" under section 431 (4) (B). A political
committee must comply with all the disclosure requirements of section 434(c) imposed upon individuals who spend over $250. These disclosure requirements include "the identification of each
person who makes a contribution

. . .

during the

reporting period, whose contribution or contributions have an aggregate amount or value in excess
of $200 within the calendar year . . ."82 Section
434(c) (2) (A) requires that the disclosure include
the name and address of each ... person who receives
any disbursement during the reporting period in an aggregate amount or value in excess of $200 within the
calendar year ...

together with the date, amount, and

purpose of any such independent expenditure and a
statement which indicates whether such independent
expenditure is in support of, or in opposition to, a candidate ... 83

Also, the report must include "the identification
of each person who made a contribution in excess
of $200 to the person filing such statement which
was made for the purpose of furthering an in8' 4

dependent expenditure. "

In addition to these disclosure requirements, a
committee must comply with other procedural requirements set forth in section 432. Under section
432(a), "[e]very political committee shall have a
treasurer. '85 The treasurer must a keep a record
of the people and organizations that contribute to
the committee, including a detailed accounting of
the amount contributed.8 6 In addition, the treasurer must "preserve all records required to be
kept by this section and copies of all reports required to be filed by this subchapter for three
8
years after the report is filed."

7

spending whatsoever."); 2 U.S.C. §§ 441b(a), 441b(b) (2) (C)

(1994). Section 441b(b) reads,
For the purposes of this section . . . the term 'contribu(C) the
tion or expenditure' ... shall not include ....

establishment, administration, and solicitation of contributions to a separate segregated fund to be utilized for
political purposes by a corporation, labor organization,
membership organization, cooperative, or corporation
without capital stock.
Id.
2 U.S.C. § 434(b) (3) (A) (1994).
82
84

2 U.S.C. § 434(b) (6)(B)(iii).
2 U.S.C. § 434(c) (2)(C).

85

2 U.S.C. § 432(a) (1994).

83

2 U.S.C. § 432(c). The committee treasurer must
keep an account of, (1) all contributions received by or
on behalf of such political committee; (2) the name and
address of any person who makes any contribution in excess of $50, together with the date and amount of such
contribution by any person; (3) the identification of any
86

Political committees under section 441b(b)
must register with the FEC by filing, "a statement
of organization no later than 10 days after establishment." 8 The statement must include
(1) the name, address, and type of committee; (2) the
name, address, relationship, and type of any connected
organization or affiliated committee; (3) the name, address, and position of the custodian of books and accounts of the committee; (4) the name and address of
the treasurer of the committee; (5) if the committee is
authorized by a candidate, the name, address, office
sought, and party affiliation of the candidate, and; (6) a
boxes, or other deposlisting of all banks, safety deposit
89
itories used by the committee.

A political committee must update any changes in
the required information, "no later than 10 days
after the date of the change."9 0 And "a political
committee may terminate only when such a committee files a written statement ...

that it will no

longer receive any contributions or make any disbursements and that such committee has no outstanding debts or obligations."9'
Furthermore, during an election year, the polical committee must file quarterly reports and a
pre- and post-election report; during non-election
92
years it is required to file only every six months.

The Court digested the information political committees must file in these reports:
[T]hese reports must contain information regarding
the amount of cash on hand; the total amount of receipts, detailed by 10 different categories; the identification of each political committee and candidate's authorized or affiliated committee making contributions,
and any persons making loans, providing rebates, refunds, dividends, or interest or any other offset to operating expenditures in an aggregate amount over $200;
the total amount of all disbursements, detailed by 12
different categories; the names of all authorized or affilperson who makes a contribution or contributions aggregating more than $200 during a calendar year, together with the date and amount of any such contribution; (4) the identification of any political committee
which makes a contribution, together with the date and
amount of any such contribution; and (5) the name and
address of every person to whom any disbursement is
made, the date, amount, and purpose of the disbursement, and the name of the candidate and the office
sought by the candidate, if any, for whom the disbursement was made, including a receipt, invoice, or canceled
check for each disbursement in excess of $200.
2 U.S.C. § 432(d) (1994).
2 U.S.C. § 433(a) (1994).
2 U.S.C. § 433(b).
2 U.S.C. § 433(c).
2 U.S.C. § 433(d) (1).
See 2 U.S.C. § 434(a) (4) (A) (1994).
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iated committees to whom expenditures aggregating
over $200 have been made; persons to whom loan repayments or refunds have been made; the total sum of
all contributions, operating expenses, outstanding
debts and obligations, and the settlement
terms of the
93"
retirement of any debt or obligation.

The Court found this labyrinth of procedures and
disclosure requirements too burdensome for
small organizations like Massachusetts Citizens for
94
Life.
The Court acknowledged a substantial government interest in compelling disclosure for corporate expenditures in political campaigns. 95 However, the Court reasoned that Massachusetts
Citizens for Life did not pose the evil of a large
corporation leveraging its power through capitalfueled expenditures. 9 6 The Court noted, "The resources it ha[d] available [were] not a function of
its success in the economic marketplace, but its
popularity in the political marketplace. '9 7 Unlike
stockholders or union members, those who contribute to an organization like Massachusetts Citizens for Life understand they are funding a political objective. 98 The Court limited its holding by
listing three distinguishing features of Massachusetts Citizens for Life that other organizations
must possess to claim immunity from section
441b:
First, it was formed tor the express purpose of promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business activities. Second, it has no shareholders or other persons
affiliated so as to have a claim on its assets or earnings.
Third .... [it] was not established by a business corporation or a labor union, and it is its policy not to accept
contributions from such entities."9

Although the Court's holding in Massachusetts
Citizens for Life is limited to only a few organizations that bear these distinguishing features, the

implication of this holding opens the door for
similarly situated organizations
93

or individuals.

Massachusetts Citizensfor Life, 479 U.S. at 253-54 (citing

2 U.S.C. § 434(b) (1994)).
94
See id. at 254.
See id. at 259.
See id.
97 1(1.
98 See id. at 260--61.
99 Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 264.
100
See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 66-68.
101 See JULIAN S. MILLSTEIN ET AL., DOING BUSINESS
95

96

THIE INTERNET: FORMS AND ANALYSIS

ON

§ 1.02[11] (1999).

102
See Jim Drinkard, E-Politics: How the Internet is Transforming Grass-Roots Campaigns, One Click Can Reach Millions,
USA TODAY, Aug. 31, 1999, at Al.
103
2 U.S.C. § 431(9)(A) (1994). "The term 'expenditire' includes-(i) any purchase, payment, distribution,
loan, advance, deposit, or gift of money or anything of value,
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Previously, the Court found that disclosure requirements pose the least restrictive means to
achieve the substantial government interest in ridding the election process of corruption.10 0 However, Massachusetts Citizens for Life creates an argument that disclosure requirements may violate the
First Amendment when they pose heavy administrative burdens.

III.

THE FEDERAL ELECTION
COMMISSION'S APPROACH TO THE

INTERNET
The Massachusetts Citizens for Life decision directed the Commission to proceed carefully with
disclosure requirements. However, at the time the
case was decided, the internet was merely a means
of communication among academic and government research centers."' 1 Just as television revolutionized the way candidates campaign for office
and the means by which citizens become informed about candidates and issues, the internet
stands to become a powerful tool for candidates
to reach voters. 1 2 The FEC has the challenge of
applying statutes crafted in the early 1970s to a
technology that has come of age in the 1990s. The
FEC's approach to internet activity as an expenditure under section 431(9) (A)10 3 and its method
for calculating the expense of internet sites for
the purposes of sections 431 (4) (A) 104 and
434(c) 105 illustrate the problem of applying old
law to new technology.
10 6
In 1996, the FEC issued an advisory opinion
concerning an on-line "electronic town meeting"
organized by Bloomberg, L.P., a network that provides news and financial information via the inmade by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office; and (ii) a written contract, promise,
or agreement to make an expenditure." Id.
104
2 U.S.C. § 431(4)(A) (1994). "The term 'political
committee' means-(A) any committee, club, association, or
other group of persons which receives contributions aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year." Id.
105
2 U.S.C. § 434(c) (1994).
I'6 The FEC is required to issue advisory opinions in response to public requests for an interpretation of the election laws. See 11 C.F.R. §§ 112.2, 112.4 (1999). These opinions must gain the approval of a majority of the six-member
commission. See 11 C.F.R. § 112.4(a) (1999). In addition,
those requesting an advisory opinion and individuals who intend to engage in activity indistinguishable from the matter
discussed may rely upon the advisory opinion in good faith.
See 11 C.F.R. § 112.5 (1999).
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ternet and other media."'

7

Candidates linked to

offices by two-way television would field questions
received though electronic mail.' 08 Bloomberg
asked whether this activity would constitute a contribution or expenditure under sections
431(8) (A) (i)

and 431(9) (A) (i).109

Because

Bloomberg primarily "acts as a news and commentary provider via computer linkages, performing a
newspaper or periodical publication function for
computer users," the FEC found that the electronic town meeting would fall under the press
exemption provided in section 431(9) (B) (i). 110
To support this finding, the Commission cited the
legislative history of the statute, which indicated
Congress's desire to exempt traditional media
from disclosure requirements."' The Commission said, "The use of audiences composed of
non-reporters, and subscribers and guests at computer terminals, does not alter the basic nature of
this meeting either as a news event akin to a press
'
conference or as a form of commentary. "112
Although the Bloomberg matter did not pose a
difficult problem for the FEC because the organization fit neatly into the characterization of a
press entity, the Commission has encountered
some difficulty computing internet expenditures
for non-press entities. For example, the Commission issued an advisory opinion in 1998 finding
that an independent website must satisfy the disclaimer requirements if it advocates the defeat of
a clearly identified federal candidate." 13 More significantly, the FEC found such a website likely to
constitute an expenditure under section
431 (9).114 The individual who requested the advi-

sory opinion was the sole owner of Capital Ventures Group, LLC, who created websites for nonprofit groups as part of its business. He created
the website in question to advocate the defeat of
107 See Advisory Opinion 1996-16, 1 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin.
Guide (CCH) 6197, 12190.

108
109
110
111

See
See
See
See

id.
id. at 12191.
id. at 12192.
id. at 12191 (citing H.R. REP. No. 93-1239, at 4

(1974)).
Id. at 12192 (citing Advisory Opinion 1982-44, Fed.
Elec. Camp. Fin. Guide Transfer Binder (CCH) 569, 10916.
113 See Advisory Opinion 1998-22, 1 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin.
Guide (CCH) 6277, 12410.
114 See id. at 12411.
115
See id. at 12409.
116 See id. at 12411.
117 See id. at 12411 n.9.
118 See Exley Complaint, supra note ????.
112

Republican candidate Representative NancyJohnson in the Sixth Congressional District of Connecticut. 115 The Commission noted that websites
are not without cost, including the registration fee
for the domain name, the cost of the computer
1 16
hardware and the utility costs to create the site.
In addition, the Commission acknowledged that
Capital Ventures Group creates websites as a business and said the valuation of creating these sites,
minus the cost of voluntary personal services, represents the cost of the expenditure.' 17 Therefore,
it seems the FEC values a website at the rate a
company would bill a client for creating a site, minus the cost of labor.
V. WWW.GWBUSH.COM: POLITICAL
SATIRE AS A CAMPAIGN EXPENDITURE
These issues came to a head when the Governor George W. Bush for President Exploratory
Committee, Inc. ("Exploratory Committee"), filed
a complaint with the FEC against a satirical website aimed at the Republican presidential candidate.' 8 Zack Exley's <www.gwbush.com> website
uses a slightly altered masthead of the official
Bush website' 11 and satirizes Bush's policies on illegal drugs, crime and other issues. 120 The Ex-

ploratory Committee alleged that the site was in
violation of section 441d because it did not have a
disclaimer. 121 The Exploratory Committee also ar-

gued that Exley's website is an expenditure in aggregate of $250, and therefore he must file an independent expenditure report required under
section 434(c) of the Act. Additionally, if Exley
has spent over $1,000 on the website during a calendar year, he must register as a political committee under sections 431(4) (A) and 433 (a) of the
Act. 122
119 See George W. Bush for President Exploratory Committee Web
Site
(visited
Sept. 5,
1999)
<www.georgewbush.com>.
120 See Exley Complaint, supra note ???2.
121
2 U.S.C. § 441d (1994). Section 441d requires,

Whenever any person makes an expenditure for the pur-

pose of financing communication expressly advocating
the election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate
....
(3) if not authorized by a candidate, an authorized
political committee of a candidate, or its agents, shall
clearly state the name of the person who paid for the
communication and state that the communication is not
authorized by any candidate or candidate's committee.
Id.
122

See Exley Complaint, supra note ????.
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If the FEC applies these statutes consistent with
the case law and its advisory opinions, the Commission is likely to find that Exley's website violates the FECA. First, by using Bush's name and
photograph, the website clearly identifies George
W. Bush. 123 In addition, the Exploratory Committee argues-and the FEC is likely to find-that
the site expressly advocates Bush's defeat.' 2 4 The
website does not show a disclaimer of any kind. In
fact, the site is designed to look like the Exploratory Committee's official website.125 For these reasons, the FEC will likely find that Exley's website
violates section 441d of the Act.'

26

If the FEC uses the factors listed in Advisory
Opinion 1998-22 for computing the cost of an expenditure over the internet, the Commission will
likely find that the cost of Exley's website exceeds
$250, requiring him to file an independent expenditure report under section 109.2 of the Commission's rules. 1 2 7 In his answer to the Exploratory Committee's complaint, Exley claimed that
he had not spent over $250 on the website.' 28
However, Exley stated in his answer that because
the site has received so much traffic as a result of
the ensuing media blitz,' 29 the cost of maintaining the site could increase exponentially through
130
his internet hosting service.

Additionally, the Exploratory Committee argues that the fair market value of the domain
name should be included in the cost of creating
the site.

3 1

Exley purchased the domain name

gwbush.com for $70, the Exploratory Committee
123

See

gwbush.com

(visited

Sept.

5,

1999)

<www.gwbush.com>.
124 See Exley Complaint, supra note ????. The complaint
alleges that the website contained the statement 'Just Say
'No' to a Former Cocaine User for President," which would

constitute express advocacy under Buckley, 424 U.S. at 44
n.52.

See gwbush.com (visited Sept. 5, 1999)
<www.gwbush.com>. Compare George W. Bush for President
Exploratory Committee Web Site (visited Sept. 5, 1999)
<www.georgewbush.com>.
125

126
127
128

2 U.S.C. § 441d (1994).
See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2 (1999).
See Letter from Zack Exley, owner, gwbush.com, to

Lawrence M. Noble, General Counsel, Federal Election Commission (June 7, 1999) available at www.gwbush.com/
metofec.htm (answer to complaint against Zack Exley and
www.gwbush.com) [hereinafter Exley Answer].
129
See, e.g., AndrewJ. Glass, InternetDomain Names Become
A Pain For Public Figures Campaign 2000, ATLANTA JOURNALCONSTITUTION, Aug. 22, 1999, at All; Jessica Lee, Bill Would
Protect Trademarks, Names From Cybersquatters,USA TODAY, Aug.
3, 1999, at 8A; Hugh Aynesworth, Bush Sees No Humor In Web
Parody of PresidentialBid, WASH. TIMES, May 23, 1999, at C4;
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rejected his offer to sell the site for $350,000.'

32

Therefore, if the FEC uses the broad cost assessment announced in Advisory Opinion 1998-22,133
the cost of creating and maintaining the website
clearly goes beyond the $250 threshold in section
434 (c).

A.

Filing for an Independent Expenditure

Should the Commission require Exley to comply with section 434(c) of the Act, he must file a
written statement with the Secretary of State in
the state where the expenditure is made.' 3 4 The
statement must include Exley's mailing address,
35
his occupation and the name of his employer.'
Exley also must disclose the amount of the expenditure.' 36 The filing must include a statement indicating that the expenditure was in opposition to
Presidential candidate George W. Bush. 13 7 Additionally, the statement must be notarized and certified under penalty of perjury that the website
was created without the cooperation, consultation
or suggestion of any candidate or candidate's
committee. 38 Finally, the report must include the
name and address of each person who contributed more than $200 in furtherance of the creation of the website.139 Because Exley pays monthly
fees to maintain the website, during the 2000 election year he must file a report by April 15,July 15,
October 15, and January 31 of the following
year.' 40 Additionally, Exley must file pre- and post4
election reports.' '
Jonathan Weisman, Bush Campaign Busy Buying Up Net Real
Estate; Strategistfor GOPFront-Runner is Hoping To Head Off Another Wicked Parody, BALTIMORE SUN, Aug. 19, 1999, at IA;
Wayne Slater, Bush Criticizes Web Site as Malicious, Owner Calls
It A Parody Of White House, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, May 5,

1999, at 29A.
130
See Exley Answer, supra note ????. In a speech, George
W. Bush criticized the site and Exley, calling him a "garbage
man," and stated, "There ought to be limits to freedom."

Slater, supra note ????.
131

See Exley Complaint, supra note ????.

132

See Martha Brant, Pressing The Flesh Online: The Mouse

That Roars, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 20, 1999, at 50.
133
SeeAdvisory Opinion 1998-22, 1 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin.
Guide (CCH) 6277, 12411 (1998).
134 See 11 C.F.R. §§ 109.2, 104.4(c)(1) (1999).
135 See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2(a)(1)(i).
136 See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2(a)(1)(iii).
137 See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2(a)(1)(iv).
138
See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2(a)(1)(v).
139 See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2(a)(1)(vi).
140 See 11 C.F.R. § 104.5(c)(1) (1999).
141 See 11 C.F.R. § 104.5(c)(1)(ii-iii).
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Filing as a Political Committee

Finally, the Exploratory Committee alleges that
the website is an expenditure exceeding $1,000,
requiring Exley to register as a political committee under sections 431(4) (A) and 433(a) of the
Act. 142 For comparison, the reporting require-

ments for individual expenditures not exceeding
$250 include filling out a two-page form.143 If Ex-

ley must register as a political committee, the
1 44
form for disclosure is twenty-eight pages.
V.

BREATHING SPACE FOR POLITICAL
ACTIVITY ON THE INTERNET

The matter concerning Zack Exley,
www.gwbush.com and Bush's Exploratory Committee shines a glaring spotlight on one of the
hidden problems of internet regulation. Federal
election regulations have not evaded the frustration caused by an interactive mass medium. The
Supreme Court acknowledged that regulations on
expenditures operate in an area of the most fundamental First Amendment activities. Discussion
of public issues and debate on the qualifications
of candidates are integral to the operation of the
system of government established by the Constitution. The First Amendment affords the broadest
protection to such political expression in order
"to assure [the] unfettered interchange of ideas
for the bringing about of political and social
14
changes desired by the people."

5

The Court in Buckley held that disclosure requirements present the least restrictive means by
which the government may rid federal elections
of corruption.' 46 However, these requirements be142

143

See Exley Complaint, supra note ????.
See, e.g., FEC Form 5 (visited Sept. 20, 1999)

<www.fec.gov>.
144

See, e.g., FEC Form 3X (visited Sept. 20, 1999)

come larger barriers when compared to the relative ease of disseminating information via the internet. The burden on free speech created by
these disclosure requirements outweighs the potential evil posed by internet communication.
Therefore, the FEC should not. impose disclosure
regulations on individual websites advocating the
election or defeat of a clearly identified candidate.
The FEC should take direction from Congress's
policy of non-regulation of the internet. In the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress removed the internet from the Federal Communication Commission's ancillary jurisdiction. Section
230 of the Act provides "it is the policy of the
United States... to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the
Internet and other interactive computer services,
unfettered by Federal or State regulation." 14 7 Furthermore, in Reno v. ACLU, the leading case on
the internet and First Amendment freedoms, the
Supreme Court distinguished the internet from
traditional media. 148 The Court said, " 'Each medium of expression .

.

. may present its own

problems.' "149 Factors the Court previously acknowledged in determining the nature of a medium include the history of government regulation of the medium, 1 50 the scarce nature of the
medium 15 1 and the invasive qualities of the medium.1 5 2 In Reno v. ACLU, the Court recognized
153
that these factors do not exist on the internet,
reinforcing the idea that government restrictions
should treat the internet as a completely separate
medium with a higher level of First Amendment

v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975)).
150

See Reno, 521 U.S. at 868 (alteration in original); see

also Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 391
(1978) (holding that the government's historical regulation

<www.fec.gov>.

of the broadcast spectrum, among other factors, justifies a

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 14 (quoting Roth v. United States,
354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).

lower standard of First Amendment scrutiny).

145

146

See id. at 66-68.

147

151

See Reno, 521 U.S. at 868; see also Turner Broadcasting

Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-

System, Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S 622, 637-638 (1994) (discussing
the scarce quality of broadcastingjustifying a reduced level of

104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-710) (1994 &
Supp. IV 1998); see also LeonardJ. Kennedy & Lori A. Zallaps,
If It Ain't Broke... The FCC and Internet Regulation, 7 COM-

First Amendment scrutiny for the curtailment of free
speech).
152 See id. at 868; see also Sable Communications of Cali-

CONSPEcrus 24 (1999) (arguing that the FCC should

fornia, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 128 (1989) (granting te-

MLAW

abstain from regulating internet technologies).
148
See Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 868 (1997) (holding
that, under the First Amendment, a statute criminalizing the

internet transmission of obscene or indecent material to minors is overbroad).
149

See id. at 868 (quoting Southeastern Promotions, Ltd.

lephony services a higher degree of First Amendment protection compared to broadcast media, reasoning that
communication over a telephone wire is less invasive because
it requires the affirmative step of dialing phone numbers,

where a broadcast listener need only turn on a radio).
153

See id. at 868-69.
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54

protection.
One commentator noted,
[Tihe Internet is fundamentally different from traditional forms of mass communication in at least three
important respects. First, the Internet is capable of
maintaining an unlimited number of information
sources, thereby eliminating traditional concerns about
"scarcity" that currently plague the broadcast media.
Second, the Internet has no "gatekeepers"-no publishers or editors controlling the distribution of information. The Internet, therefore, facilitates decentralization of the supply of information. Finally, the users of
55
Internet information are also its producers.1

These factors alone do not make a case for a
higher degree of First Amendment protection.
However, these factors, coupled with the political
content potentially at risk of suppression, present
a clear answer that prudence dictates a high degree of protection for independent political activity on the internet.
Because Congress, the Federal Communications Commission and the courts have afforded
the internet a high level of protection against regulations that burden speech, 156 the FEC should
follow this example and create a "safe harbor" for
unfettered political speech on the internet. The
FEC can achieve this goal in one of two ways. First,
the Commission could carve out an exception
under section 109.2 of the Commission's rules,
which requires disclosure for individuals who
spend over $250 advocating the election or defeat
of a federal candidate. 15 7 Second, the FEC should
change its approach to calculating the cost of creating a website for the purposes of advocating the
58
election or defeat of a federal candidate.

A.

Creating an Exemption

An exception to section 109.2 of the Commission's rules for individual internet expenditures
Cf Andrew Chin, Making the World Wide Web Safe for
Democracy: A Medium-Specific FirstAmendment Analysis, 19 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 309, 330-32 (1997) (criticizing the District Court's decision in ACLUv. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D.
Pa. 1996)). Chin argues that to attain the optimal amount of
public discourse on the internet, government must impose a
"must-carry" rule for websites. See id. This rule would compel
popular sites to carry links to less popular websites. See id.
155
See Sandford & Lorenger, supra note ????, at 1141-42.
156
See FCC Chairman William E. Kennard, Address
Before the Federal Communications Bar, Northern California Chapter, San Francisco, CA, The Unregulation of the Internet: Laying a Competitive Course for the Future (July 20, 1999)
(noting that the FCC created a deregulatory environment for
the internet) available at <www.fcc.gov/Speeches/Kennard/
spwek924.html> .
154
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would be analogous to the narrow exception created by the Supreme Court in FEC v. Massachusetts
Citizens for Life.159 In that case, the Court recognized that administrative costs associated with registration and disclosure requirements unconstitutionally burden political speech when applied
to a small, non-profit organization.16 1 Similarly,
even the most simple disclosure requirements
under sections 109.2'61 and 104.4(c) (1) 162 of the
FEC's rules pose a heavy burden on political
speech over the internet. Because the internet has
the potential to diminish the gap between those
with political influence and those without the resources to organize powerful political committees,
the FEC should take measures to make individual
political speech unfettered by election law regulation and disclosure requirements. Commissioner
Karl Sandstrom, one of the six members of the
Federal Election Commission, said,
On the Internet, every woman and man is a potential
publisher. There is no class distinction between the
elite and the common person. The raw egalitarianism
of this new frontier appeals to the American spirit.
Here the hope lives that the force of an argument can
prevail over the might of the pocketbook. One need
only visit the web page of a sophisticated high school
student to see
how slim a technical advantage media gi163
ants enjoy.

Imposing disclosure requirements will not
smother political speech on the internet, but it
will impose a formidable deterrent. As the Court
said in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life,

"[w]hile the burden on [Massachusetts Citizens
for Life's] speech is not insurmountable, we cannot permit it to be imposed without a constitutionally adequate justification."' 16 4 Similarly, the
FEC should carve out an exemption to section
109.2 of the Commission's rules. The exception
would allow individuals, whose expenditures

See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2(a) (1999).
See Advisory Opinion 1998-22, 1 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin.
Guide (CCH) 6277, 12411.
159
See FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479
U.S. 238, 263 (1986).
160 See id. at 263.
161
See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2 (1999).
162 See 11 C.F.R. § 104.4(c)(1) (1999).
163
See Karl Sandstrom .... And the Internet, WASH. POST,
Sept. 5, 1999, at B7 (asserting that the FEC should regulate
speech on the internet in a manner that will encourage participation in public discourse. However, Sandstorm did not
pose any possible solutions or Commission action that would
further this goal.).
164
See Massachusetts Citizensfor Life, 478 U.S. at 263.
157
158
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would otherwise fall under sections 109.1165 and

109.2,166 to create internet sites that advocate the
election or defeat of a federal candidate.
The burden of disclosure for individual expenditures on the internet is a modest assault on
the freedom of speech. However, the Supreme
Court said in Massachusetts Citizens for Life, "Our
pursuit of other governmental ends, however,
may tempt us to accept in small increments a loss
that would be unthinkable if inflicted all at once.
For this reason, we must be as vigilant against the
modest diminution of speech as we are against its
sweeping restriction."'

67

Calculating the Cost of an Internet
Expenditure

B.

Alternatively, the FEC could simply calculate
the amount of an internet expenditure differently
than its previous method laid out in Advisory
Opinion 1998-22.168 In that Advisory Opinion, the
Commission said that the cost of a website includes the registration fee for the domain name,
computer hardware and the utility costs to create
the site.' 69 Also, the Commission indicated that a
website's value may be the amount a web designer
charges a client less the cost of labor.' 7 1 The

candidate. This expenditure does not require disclosure to the FEC under section 109.2 of the
Commission's rules because it does not exceed
$250.171 However, if the Commission included the

cost of the automobile in the total cost of the expenditure, the cost of the bumper sticker would
easily exceed the $250 disclosure threshold. Furthermore, if the value of the automobile exceeds
$1000, the owner would have to register and disclose as a political committee under sections
100.5(a) and 102.1(d) of the Commission's
rules.1 72 Like the automobile, computer hardware
and the utility costs associated with creating a web
page merely provide the mobility of the message,
not the message itself.
Including the cost of a computer's hardware almost certainly places expenditures involving the
internet well above $250. The FEC should ignore
these costs when computing expenditures on the
internet; the amount paid for the website's domain name should be the only relevant expenditure.1 7 3 Obtaining a domain name currently entails a $70 registration fee for two years of
service. 7 4 The renewal fee is $35.175 This method
of computation would allow an individual to create a web page advocating the election or defeat
of a federal candidate without breaking the $250

FEC's method of computation for internet expenditures is analogous to compelling an expenditure disclosure for creating a political bumper
sticker and adhering it to an automobile. For example, an individual creates a single bumper
sticker advocating the election of a presidential

disclosure threshold in section 109.2176 or the
1 77
$1,000 threshold in section 100.5(a).

See 11 C.F.R. § 109.1 (1999). Section 109.1(a)-(b) (1)
165
defines an "independent expenditure" as
an expenditure by a person for a communication expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly
identified candidate which is not made with the cooperation or with the prior consent of, or in consultation
with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate or

See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2; see also 2 U.S.C. § 434(c).
See 11 C.F.R. §§ 100.5(a), 102.1(d); see also 2 U.S.C
§§ 431 (4) (A), 433(a).
The domain name is the series of letters, numbers,
173
characters and periods (dots) assigned to computers connected to the internet. See MILLSTEIN, supra note 101, at

any agent or authorized committee of such candidate.
(b) For purposes of this definition-(1) Person means
an individual, partnership, committee, association, qualified nonprofit corporation under 11 C.F.R. § 114.10(c),
or any organization or group of persons, including a separate segregated fund established by a labor organization, corporation, or national bank (see part 114) but
does not mean a labor organization, corporation not
qualified under 11 C.F.R. § 114.10(c), or national bank.

Id.
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167

See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2.
See Massachusetts Citizens for Life, 478 U.S. at 264-65.
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See Advisory Opinion 1998-22, 1 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin.
Guide (CCH) 6277, 12411 (1998).
See id.
169
See id. at n.9.
170

One could argue that the cost of a website
should include the cost of an internet service provider that acts as a gateway, or point of entry to
the internet.
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However, this cost does not repre-
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§ 1.04[1] n.1 (1999).
174 See id, at § 2.03[1] n.5 (1999); see also Linda A. Goldstein, Advertising On The Internet: Laws and Regulations, 547
PLI/PAT 353, 356 (1999).
175 See MILLSTEIN, supra note101, at § 2.03[1] n.5; see also
Goldstein, supra note 174, at 356.
176
See 11 C.F.R. § 109.2.
177 See 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(a). "Except as provided in 11
C.F.R. 100.5(b), (c) and (d), any committee, club, association, or other group of persons which receives contributions
aggregating in excess of $1,000 or which makes expenditures
aggregating in excess of $1,000 during a calendar year is a
political committee." 11 C.F.R. § 100.5(a).
178
See MILLSTEIN, supra note 101, at § 1.04[1] (describing internet service providers as tools enabling "individuals to
reach the internet and proprietary networks through dial-up
phone service or through direct telecommunications connec-
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sent the cost of creating a website, because the
cost of an internet service provider implicitly includes costs for a bundle of different services. As
the name implies, an internet service provider
supplies not only a point of entry to the internet
but a number of services such as email and other
resources, 17 including the space to create a website.' 80 Therefore, including the cost of an individual's internet service provider overcompensates for the actual cost of the website bearing the
advocacy for a federal candidate. Additionally,
once on the internet, an individual may obtain
space to construct a website free of charge.'I
However, it is important to distinguish internet
sites from advertising on the internet. Currently,
the FEC considers all communication on the internet to be advertising.1 8 2 In a 1995 Advisory

Opinion, the Commission said,
In recent years, there has been a rapid expansion of
services available on the Internet, a sizable increase in
the number of persons using it, increased ease of accessing the Internet, and a decline in the costs of hardware
and software needed to do so. The Commission concludes that the combination of these factors means that
use of... World Wide Web site [s]...should be viewed

as a form of general public political advertising under
11 C.F.R. § 110.11.18"

Although the FEC should exempt websites created by individuals, it is important that the Commission continue disclosure requirements for individuals or organizations that pay other website
operators to carry their message on the internet.
Otherwise, a full internet exemption would license powerful political committees to saturate
tions"). Millstein continues,
Internet service providers, in addition to furnishing access to the internet, offer services such as website hosting
and design, and, once a party is online, e-mail and other
internet-based resources. [Internet Service Providers]
also may offer domain name-related services, including
domain name registration. They typically provide access
to the internet by means of telecommunications lines
which they own or lease from telecommunications carriers.
Id.
179 See, e.g.,
America Online (visited Oct. 9, 1999)
<www.aol.com>. America Online provides chat rooms and
personalized information regarding local weather, movie listings, news and sports in addition to access to the internet and
email accounts. See id.
180 See MILLSTEIN, supra note 101, at § 1.04[1].
181 See, e.g., Rotf Online Services (visited Oct. 13, 1999)
<www.rotfl.com> (offering free email and two megabytes of
web space for individual web pages); Geocities (visited Oct. 13,
1999) <geocities.yahoo.com/home> (offering eleven
megabytes of disk space for individual websites and tools to
design websites without cost).
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popular websites with advertisements advocating
for their candidate. 184
On September 14, 1999, the House of Repre18 5
sentatives passed a bill reforming the FECA.
Congressman Tom DeLay introduced an amendment to the bill that sought to exempt all internet
activity from regulation. 186 The amendment was
defeated by a 160-268 vote. 18 7 Congressman DeLay's amendment to the bill was misguided. DeLay's approach would subvert the purpose of federal election laws, which attempt to "limit the
actuality and appearance of corruption resulting
from large individual financial contributions."' 8
Congressman Tom Allen said in opposition to
Congressman DeLay's amendment,
The Internet is growing at an exponential rate. Congress thus far has taken a hands-off policy to let the Internet grow and flourish. The DeLay amendment, however, could undermine the freedom of the Internet by
making it the favored conduit for special interests to
fund soft money and stealth issue ads into federal campaigns. Let us not poison the Internet and poison our
democracy with this poison pill. 18 9

A categorical exemption for internet expenditures would allow wealthy political committees
and candidates to saturate the web with advertisements and fund-raising websites, gouging a giant
loophole through which campaign expenditures
may flow freely and without disclosure. However,
narrowly calculating the cost of creating an internet site will not create a loophole in current
federal election law.
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See Advisory Opinion 1995-9, 1 Fed. Elec. Camp. Fin.
Guide (CCH) 6146, 12055.
183
See id.
184
See, e.g., 145 CONG. REc. H8250 (daily ed. Sept. 14,

1999).
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See H.R. 417, 106th Cong. (1999).

186

See 145 CONG. REC. H8250, H8255. The amendment

read,
Section 330. (a) In General-Except as provided in subsection (b), none of the limitations, prohibitions, or reporting requirements of this Act shall apply to any activity carried out through the use of the Internet or to any
information disseminated through the Internet. (b) Exception-Subsection (a) shall not apply to the solicitation or receipt of contributions. (c) Internet definedThe term 'Internet' means the international computer
network of both Federal and non-Federal interoperable
packet-switched data networks.
Id.
187
See id. at H8260.
188
189

Buckley, 424 U.S. at 26.
145 CONG. REC. H8250, H8256.
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VI.

Independent Expenditures on the Internet

CONCLUSION

Although the internet does not represent the
answer to our problem-ridden campaign finance
laws, it presents a new tool with which individuals
may voice their opinion and attempt to influence
elections without the need for heavily funded
political committees. As a matter of policy, it is
wise to give breathing space to political activity on

the internet. Although our notions of the internet's impact and implications may change over
time, prudence dictates a "hands off' approach to
political activity on the internet at this time. It is
better to err on the side of free political speech
on the internet than to quash a flourishing medium through which all participating may be
heard.

